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Demography and Inflation: An International Study 
 





Changes in the relative share of different age groups in the population may present inflationary, 
disinflationary or even deflationary tendencies. We find evidence that increases in the share of 
the very old (age 80 and older) may be associated with deflation. The analysis is based on an 
international dataset over a long time period. Classifying age groups into young, working, 
younger old and older old, we find that the shares of the young and the younger old groups are 
inflationary, while those of the working group disinflationary, and those of the very old group 
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In many countries, the population is aging. Actuaries are aware of the financial impact that 
increasing old-age dependency ratios will have for PayGo pension schemes and other unfunded 
social support systems, such as health and long-term care. But what impact will a changing 
demographic structure have, if any, on economic factors such as inflation? This question is also 
of vital importance to actuaries who use demographic and economic projections in the pricing 
and valuation of products, design of risk management solutions, and in opinions regarding the 
sustainability of social programs. Many actuarial products are priced and valued using nominal 
interest rates. The profitability of such products is directly affected by the level of inflation. 
Actuarial present values of future income streams are lower the higher the inflation rate used for 
valuation. Should our models account for any association between ageing and the level of 
inflation? This paper examines the above question using an international dataset, to offer insights 
that may be of use to practicing actuaries. 
The world population has experienced a drastic shift in terms of both size and 
composition in the past few decades. Figure 1 depicts the (unweighted) mean proportions of 
three age groups (the Young 0-19, Working Age 20-64, and the Old 65+) across 22 OECD 
countries, over the period 1955-2010. In this sample, the average proportion of the Old group has 
increased from 9% in 1955 to 16% in 2010, with most of the decline in share occurring in the 
Young group. The average proportion of the population in the Working Age group increased 




Figure 1: Unweighted cross-country average population shares 
 
Note: The sample consists of 22 OECD countries. For the purpose of this chart, we divide the population into three 
age groups: the Young (0-19 years), Working Age (20-64 years) and Old (65 years and over). We plot the cross-
country average of the share in population of each age group for each year from 1955 to 2010. The data source is the 
United Nations World Population Prospects (2013). 
 
Currently, several aging countries are also experiencing historically low inflation and, in 
some instances, even deflation. Given the projected global aging, it is important to understand 
the link between the two (if it exists), since it may have significant implications for actuarial 
practice. In three panels in Figure 2, we plot the cumulative inflation against the change in the 
proportion of the population of Young 0-19, Working Age 20-64, and the Old 65+, respectively, 
over the period 1955 ± 2010 for our sample of 22 countries. These plots suggest that countries 
with a smaller decrease in the share of the Young experienced lower inflation while those with a 
greater increase in the share of the Working Age experienced higher inflation. On the other hand, 
the association with the Old is unclear. Without controlling for other factors, this is contrary to 
recent findings that higher shares of working age population are associated with lower inflation. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Inflation (1955 ± 2010) vs. Changes in the proportions of age groups 
 
Note: The sample consists of 22 OECD countries. For each country, we calculate the change between 1955 and 
2010 in the share of each of three age groups: the Young (0-19 years), Working Age (20-64 years) and Old (65 years 
and over). We plot this change against the cumulative inflation over the same period in each of the countries, 
presenting one scatter plot for each age group. Note the horizontal axis scales are different. 
 
With respect to the relation between the Old group and inflation, recent studies by Yoon 
et al. (2014) and Juselius and Takáts (2015, 2016a, 2016b) arrive at opposing conclusions 
although they use similar datasets in their studies. In particular, while Yoon et al. predict that an 
increase in the share of the older age groups relative to those under 15 years old will potentially 
introduce deflationary pressures on the economy, Juselius and Takáts find that the older age 
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group exerts inflationary pressures. 5  We hypothesize that to reconcile these two opposing 
findings, a finer decomposition of the older age group will be required. 
We present analyses using both, an age grouping similar to that used in the literature, and 
one in which the older ages are separated into two groups. A typical time trend of inflation 
among the OECD countries is that it rose in the late 1960s and after peaking in the late 1970s it 
gradually declined and stayed relatively low in the 1990s and thereafter. To avoid conflating the 
possibly independent trends in demography and inflation, we also analyze the relationship over 
two sub-periods, 1955-1979 and 1980-2010. 
Juselius and Takáts (2015) introduced a polynomial specification for the relationship 
between population age share and inflation, reporting a large variation of specifications and tests 
based on this structure. We first implemented the apparently most robust version of their 
regression model, with a fourth degree polynomial in demographics, fixed effects, and various 
controls as regressors. We do this for the total period and the two sub-periods 1955-79 and 1980-
2010.6  We find that older ages have a disinflationary or deflationary association. However, 
Juselius and Takáts (2015, 2016a, 2016b) did not elaborate on somewhat similar findings in their 
paper, instead they focussed on the U-VKDSH RI WKH ³SUH-WDLO´ SRUWLRQ of their polynomial 
estimates. 
We believe that the tail is in fact important and significant, and may perhaps offer an 
opportunity to reconcile conflicting findings. To show this, we extended the number of age 
groupings in our second investigation. Using OECD data for a shorter sub-period, 1990-2010, we 
                                                        
5
 Although the sign is negative, the significance of the relationship between the old age group and inflation is not 
entirely clear from the results reported by Yoon et al. (2014), while Juselius and Takáts (2015, 2016a, 2016b) use an 
alternative methodology, ignoring the tail end of their estimates. We discuss this in more detail in Section 2. 
6We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise. It is worth noting that including time fixed 
effects in the model makes the demographic variables similar across the two sub-periods. 
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made use of a finer breakdown of the old age group available for this period. We found that the 
relationship at older ages is strongly deflationary for this latter period, but not so for the younger 
old. This is also consistent with the findings of studies on Japanese data (see Anderson et al., 
2014; Muto et al., 2012; Shirakawa, 2012). Our findings also remain qualitatively the same when 
we estimate panel regressions for the entire sample period of 56 years and the two major sub-
periods, this time separating the older age groups into younger old (65-74 years) and older old 
(75+). 
The above analyses do not provide evidence of causation, but rather of association, which 
is the goal of this paper. However, as a complementary analysis, we estimated a reduced-form 
panel-data Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to capture dynamic interactions among some 
key macroeconomic variables and shares of age groups. Our aim was to determine how much of 
the variation in inflation can be explained by the evolution of the demographic structure, when 
allowance is made for interactions among these other key macroeconomic variables. We found 
that the changing age profile across selected countries does have an economically and 
statistically significant impact on inflation, after controlling for oil prices. However, the short 
period of appropriate data availability for this exercise means that we again observe a life-cycle 
pattern; i.e., dependent cohorts in general have an inflationary impact. Our conclusion is that 
only more advanced aging shows a deflationary association, thereby explaining some of the 
contradictions in the literature. 
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a 
selected review of literature. In Sections 3 and 4, we provide two investigations, including 
analyses on the OECD panel over different sub-periods, and on the OECD panel with more age 
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groupings in the older tail. In Section 5, we provide analysis using the reduced form panel-data 
VAR to provide a form of robustness check on our analysis. Section 6 concludes 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
There is considerable literature regarding the effects of demography, in particular the age 
structure of the population, on economic growth, and other leading macroeconomic variables. In 
particular, the link between age structure and growth has been widely studied in recent times.7 
Evidence of the economic significance of the impact of the age structure on the economy has not 
been clear cut. On the one hand, theoretical macroeconomic models, which are typically 
calibrated on the age profile of savings, have highlighted the importance of demographic 
structure, as have many commentaries on economic policy. On the other hand, the econometric 
evidence assembled has been seen to be less compelling. There are a number of reasons for this.  
In particular, most of the changes in demographic structure have occurred at low 
frequencies. This renders it difficult to distinguish the impact of demographic structure from the 
other low frequency trends that typically dominate economic time series. In addition, the vector 
of proportions in each age group is also inevitably highly collinear, making precise estimation of 
the effect of each age group a difficult, if not impossible, task. Faced with these difficulties, it 
has become a common practice in this literature simply to impose strong restrictions on the effect 
of the demographic structure, for instance, through the use of a single proxy, known as the 
dependency ratio. However, the balance of the evidence suggests that one cannot rule out the risk 
that an older age structure has a negative impact on economic growth. Given this evidence, it is 
reasonable to expect that an economy with an aging population, when accompanied by high debt 
                                                        
7
 For studies on this subject, see Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Arnott and Chaves (2011), Bloom et al. (2007), 
Bloom et al. (2010), Callen et al. (2004), Feyrer (2007), Gomez and Hernandez de Cos (2008), Jaimovich and Siu 
(2009), Katagiri (2012), Konishi and Ueda (2013), Lindh and Malmberg (1999), McMorrow and Roeger (1999). 
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and low employment, may give rise to an environment that has a tendency to have low inflation 
or even deflation. 
Japan has the most rapidly aging population in the world and experienced persistent 
deflation over the past two decades. Various channels through which demographic changes 
affect inflation in Japan have been examined in the past few years. Using a deterministic life-
cycle economic model with capital, Bullard et al. (2012) find that the optimal inflation rates 
suggest that aging population structures like those in Japan may contribute to observed low rates 
of inflation or even deflation. Katagiri (2012) investigates the effects of changes in demand 
structure caused by population aging on the Japanese economy using a multi-sector Keynesian 
model with job creation/destruction. He finds that such demand shocks caused around 0.3 
percentage point deflationary pressure on year-to-year inflation from the early 1990s to the 
2000s in Japan. Katagiri (2012) shows that the repetition of such upward revisions made those 
effects look more persistent. 
Based on simulation of a calibrated IMF Global Integrated Fiscal and Monetary (GIMF) 
model, Anderson et al. (2014) find that substantial deflationary pressures arise from population 
aging, mainly from declining growth and falling land prices. In addition, the repatriation of 
foreign assets by the elderly leads to real exchange rate appreciation, which exerts a downward 
pressure on inflation because of increased demand for relatively cheaper foreign goods and 
services8. By embedding the fiscal theory of the price level9 into an OLG model, Katagiri et al. 
(2014) find that the effects of aging critically depend on its causes. Aging is deflationary when 
caused by an increase in longevity but inflationary when caused by a decline in birth rate. In the 
                                                        
8
 There is a considerable increase in the proportion of imported foreign goods in domestic consumption in Japan 
over the last decade. According to World Bank national account data, this ratio was 9.8% in 2001 and continuously 
increased to 19.0% in 2013. 
9
 Fiscal theory of the price level states that the government will reduce the impact of its (debt) obligations of an 
unsustainable policy through inflation. 
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case of Japan, they believe that it is unexpected longevity, not simply aging, that has induced a 
deflationary pressure. In addition, Societe Generale (2016) provides an overview for 
consequences of aging for price dynamics. It argues that the graying of the population could 
potentially influence price dynamics through a wide-ranging set of key macroeconomic variables 
and therefore it is hard to tell from the purely theoretical perspective how changes in 
demographics will ultimately shape the inflation rate behavior. 
Our paper is focused on the empirical aspects of the relationship between population 
aging and inflation. In recent studies, Juselius and Takáts (2015, 2016a, 2016b) and Yoon et al. 
(2014) have estimated the effect of demographic changes on inflation using post-war panel data 
of developed countries. However, they reached opposing conclusions. 
On the one hand, using a panel dataset covering 30 OECD economies for the period of 
1960-2013, Yoon et al. (2014) find that population growth is inflationary, while aging is 
potentially deflationary. On the other hand, looking at a similar panel of 22 OECD countries 
from 1955 ± 2010, Juselius and Takáts (2015, 2016a, 2016b) find that aging is inflationary rather 
than deflationary. That is, a larger share of dependents (both young and old) is correlated with 
higher inflation, whereas having more working population leads to lower inflation. Both papers 
extend their arguments based on the relative speed of adjustment of aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand to provide some intuition for their findings.  
To compare the two papers, we identify a panel regression in each paper that can be 
directly compared with its counterpart in the other paper. Table 4, Specification 3 in Yoon et al. 
(2014), and Table 1, Specification 4 in Juselius and Takáts (2015) are as follows: 
 ߨ௜௧ ൌ ߤ଴ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߚଵݏ௜௧௪ ൅ ߚଶݏ௜௧௢ ൅ ߝ௜௧ ǡ [1] 
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 ߨ௜௧ ൌ ݑ௜ ൅ ߠଵݏ௜௧௬ ൅ ߠଶݏ௜௧௪ ൅ ߠଷݏ௜௧௢ ൅ ߳௜௧ Ǥ [2] 
where ݏ௜௧௬, ݏ௜௧௪, and ݏ௜௧௢  are the shares of young, working age and old, respectively. Ɋ଴ is a constant 
and Ɋ୧ is the country-specific fixed effect. Note that there is no constant in Equation [2] because 
the three population shares sum to unity. The difference between them lies in their treatment of 
trend inflation: while one uses a quadratic filter to remove the trend, the other incorporates time 
fixed effects in the model. Overall, the net effect of the old age group on inflation according to 
Yoon et al. (2014) is estimated as ఓబଵ଴଴ ൅ ߚଶ ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?, but the statistical significance of this net 
effect is not reported in their paper. In both papers, the coefficient on the share of the working 
age group is also found to be negative, although it is statistically significant only in the study by 
Juselius and Takáts (2015). Their findings agree on the inflationary tendency of the young 
(dependents) group. In the rest of the paper, we conduct analyses that help show the importance 
of incorporating distinct groups for older ages in the dataset. 
3 ANALYSIS OF OECD DATA FOR VARIOUS TIME PERIODS 
In this section, following Juselius and Takáts (2015), we examine the relationship between 
inflation and demographic structure for various time periods using panel analysis. The full panel 
covers the period of 1955 ± 2010, but we also examine the relationship for shorter sub-periods. 
In terms of country coverage, we use 22 OECD countries for which good quality data are 
available: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
The annual inflation rate is obtained from OECD, World Bank Indicators and national 
data. We denote the inflation rate as ߨ௜௧. We index country by݅where,݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ,ܰ and year by 
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ݐ where, ݐ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ .ܶ The demographic data was obtained from the United Nations (2012). In 
this analysis, we use finer demographic proportions: the total population (0 ± 80+) is divided into 
17 five-year age groups (denoted by ௞ܰ௜௧ where݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ? ?). The corresponding share of group ݇ LQDFRXQWU\¶VWRWDOSRSXODWLRQLVJLYHQby ݊௞௜௧ ൌ ௞ܰ௜௧Ȁ ௜ܰ௧.  
In addition to inflation rate and age structure variables, we use the following control 
variables. First, the real interest rate ୧୲, is used to roughly proxy the monetary policy. We define 
the ex-post real interest rate as the difference between the average nominal overnight rate and the 
inflation rate during the same year. We collect and compile nominal interest data from various 
VRXUFHV LQFOXGLQJ2(&' ,0)¶V:RUOG(FRQRPLF2XWORRN:(2DQGQDWLRQDOGDWD6HFRQG
the inflation rate may also be affected by the output gap, as suggested by standard monetary 
models. To compute the output gap ݕ௜௧ , we use the deviation in real GDP from a Hodrick-
Prescott filtered trend (ZLWKȜVHWWRWKHVWDQGDUGYDOXHIRU\HDUO\IUHTXHQF\). Finally, data of 
real GDP is obtained from OECD and WEO.  
The panel-regression model is written as 
 ߨ௜௧ ൌ ߤ଴ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ෍ ߛ௣ ෤݊௣௜௧ସ௣ୀଵ ൅ ߚଵݎ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶݕො௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ Ǥ [3] 
where ߤ଴ is a constant, ߤ௜  and ߤ௧  are the country-specific and time fixed effects, respectively. ෤݊௣௜௧ are the fourth order population polynomials10, which are used to overcome the estimation 
problems associated with direct use of age groups. Once estimates of the ߛ௣ have been obtained, 
the corresponding coefficients on age groups can be directly computed.  
We examine the age patterns on inflation for the OECD panel with various sub-periods, 
including those years before and after 1980. Results are reported in Table 1. The first column 
                                                        
10See Fair and Dominguez (1991), Higgins (1998), and Arnott and Chaves (2011) for details. 
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presents the estimates of our panel regression over the whole period. The second and third 
columns are for the sub-period of 1955 ± 1979 and the sub-period of 1980-2010, respectively. 
The last column lists the estimates for the model with more refined age groups over the period of 
1990-2010 (discussed below in Section 4). 
Table 1: The relationship between demography and inflation for various periods 
(Dependent variable: inflation rate Ɏ୧୲) 
Model 22 OECD 1955-2010 22 OECD 1955-1979  22 OECD 1980-2010 22 OECD 1990-2010 (100+) 
Polynomial n1 0.21 1.09*** -0.28 0.26 
Polynomial n2 (×10) -0.92** -3.22*** -0.11 -0.84*** 
Polynomial n3 (×102) 0.98*** 3.18*** 0.57** 0.81*** 
Polynomial n4 (×103) -0.31*** -0.99*** -0.26*** -0.24*** 
Real interest rate -0.54*** -0.65*** -0.52*** -0.41*** 
Output gap 0.04*** 0.07* 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 
    
R-squared 0.80 0.88 0.77 0.71 
Observations 1023 367 656 451 
Note: We report the results of panel regressions of inflation on an age polynomial and control variables controlling 
for country fixed effects and time fixed effects (not included here for ease of reading). The dataset represents annual 
observations for a panel of 22 OECD countries. The final column uses data for a shorter period, but with a finer 
distribution of population age shares in the older age groups. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
Estimated coefficients of the population polynomials are statistically significant in most 
cases, with the weakest results for the period 1980-2010. The age group effects on inflation are 
computed using estimates of ߛ௣ and presented in Figure 3. The dotted, dashed and solid curves 
are derived from the panel regressions over the whole period, the sub-period of 1955 ± 1979 and 
the sub-period of 1980-2010, respectively. The relationship exhibits a U-shape until 
approximately age 70, but then reverses downward again for later ages. The young and the 
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younger old age groups have a positive impact on inflation, whereas the working age population 
and the older age groups have a negative effect. 
Figure 3: Age group impacts on inflation: Complete data and sub-periods 
 
Note: The dotted, dashed and solid curves are produced from the age polynomials in the panel regressions (Equation 
3) over the whole period, the sub-period of 1955 ± 1979 and the sub-period of 1980-2010, respectively. 
 
Compared with the full period benchmark model (the dotted line), the effects in the two 
sub-periods appear more pronounced, but they follow roughly the same pattern. 
In addition, in each regression, the real interest rate has a significant negative effect, 
while the output gap also affects inflation. These support the suggestion in Juselius and Takáts 
(2015) to include these variables as regressors. 
4 ANALYSIS OF THE VERY OLD 
From observing the relationship between the age patterns and inflation, it is reasonable to 
K\SRWKHVL]H WKDW WKH ³\RXQJHU ROG´ PD\ EH LQIODWLRQDU\ EXW WKH ³ROGHU ROG´ DUH GHIODWLRQDU\
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from 1990, i.e. data on 80-84, 85-89, 90-94, 95-99, 100+ age groups, we can test the hypothesis 
using an OECD panel over the period of 1990 ± 2010. The estimation results are listed in the last 
column of Table 1. All estimated coefficients are statistically significant, even though the use of 
the short period (1990 ± 2010) decreases the explanatory power of the covariates.  
Figure 4 shows the age group effects on inflation. The solid curve represents the age 
pattern derived from the new sub-period panel regression with finer demographic data. The 
dashed line is for the same sub-period panel but with the original age group definition. The 
dotted line is again for the benchmark model with full panel. From the graph, it is obvious that 
our hypothesis is supported. That is, for the old population, the older the age, the more 
deflationary the age group is. In addition, the U shape is less pronounced for the new sub-period 
panel. 
Figure 4: Age group impacts on inflation: refined age groups 
 
Note: The dotted and dashed curves are derived from the panel regressions over the whole period, the sub-period of 
1990 ± 2010, respectively. The solid curve represents the age pattern derived from the sub-period 1990-2010 panel 
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It is important to recognise that period 1990-2010 was characterized by low and declining 
inflation, so although we include time fixed effects in the regression, the estimates over this 
period should be interpreted with caution. A referee has suggested that we seek more evidence of 
our hypothesis by conducting a further sub-period analysis, by breaking the sample into a higher 
inflation period (1955-1979) and a declining inflation period (1980-2010). To this end, we 
estimate further panel regressions of inflation on demographic structure, this time using shares of 
age groups as regressors. However, we break the older age group into two parts.  The model 
specifications are as follows. 
 ߨ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ݏ௜௧௬ ൅ ݏ௜௧௪ ൅ ݏ௜௧௬௢ ൅ ݏ௜௧௩௢ ൅ ߚଵݎ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶݕො௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ Ǥ [4] 
where (ݏ௜௧௬ǡ ݏ௜௧௪ ǡ ݏ௜௧௬௢ǡ ݏ௜௧௩௢) are the shares of age groups in total population for the young (0-19), the 
working age (20-64), the younger old (65-74) and the very old (75+) respectively. The estimation results 
are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Demographic structure and inflation: Sub-period analysis 
(Dependent variable: inflation rate Ɏ୧୲) 
 
Sub-period 1955 - 1979 Sub-period 1980 - 2010 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of young (0-19) 0.12 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 
Share of working (20-64) -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 
Share of young old (65-74) 3.33*** 0.67 0.18 0.58*** 
Share of very old (75+) -5.70*** -2.23** -0.48* -0.47** 
Real interest rate  -0.63***  -0.55*** 
Output gap  0.08**  0.03*** 
 
    
R-squared 0.858 0.954 0.833 0.882 
Observations 550 367 682 656 
Note: We report the results of panel regressions (Equation 4) of inflation on shares of age groups and control 
variables, with fixed effects (not included here for ease of reading). The dataset represents annual observations for a 
panel of 22 OECD countries. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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For both periods, the share of the young old is associated with positive coefficients, 
although they are statistically significant in only two out of four cases. The coefficient on the 
share of the very old is significant and negative in all four regressions. In the sub-period 1955-
1979, controlling for the real interest rate and the output gap leads to a drop in the size of the 
estimate but it retains its significance. The estimate is still much larger than that in the sub-period 
1980-2010. While controlling for conditions through the real interest rate and the output gap 
would plausibly reduce the size of the estimate in the first sub-period, the difference between the 
two sub-periods requires some consideration. One possible explanation for this difference is that 
both the level and variability of inflation were much higher in the first sub-period than the 
second. This is especially plausible because the regressions also include time fixed effects to 
control for factors such as the change in the relative size of the older age groups over time. 
Overall, we can see that the inclusion of the older age group helps in clarifying the association 
between age and inflation. 
5 VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL AND SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS 
We carry out additional work to incorporate dynamics in our analysis using a VAR model. While 
VAR is a more robust approach to use since it is model free, changes in data definitions affect 
the ability to model the cross-country panel time series in this way. After reviewing changes in 
methods in compiling the OECD data, there is only a relatively short period of data that we could 
use. Since we are investigating the long term impact of demographics, which may have low 
frequency impacts, the short period of consistent data is a limitation for this methodology. Hence, 




The approach undertaken in this section has three important characteristics. First, we 
consider one year period and adopt a panel time-series approach to estimation of our VAR 
models. Second, we allow for interaction effects among a number of leading macroeconomic 
variables by estimating a VAR model instead of an individual equation. Third, we make no 
assumptions about the underlying economic processes and hence impose a minimal structure on 
the data. 
5.1 Data and econometric model  
The annual dataset covers the period 1999-2010 covering twenty countries. Because of 
differences in data sources, in this analysis Iceland has been added, but Korea, Portugal and 
Spain have been excluded. 
The demographic data was obtained from the United Nations (2012). The annual data on 
savings and investment rates were calculated from Nominal GDP, Investment and Savings series 
obtained from the OECD (2012), which also supplied the data on hours worked. Annual data on 
policy rates and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) were obtained from the IMF (2012). Per-capita 
GDP growth rates were calculated from per-capita real GDP obtained from Penn World Tables 
7.1.  
We index country by݅where,݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ,ܰ and year by ݐ where,ݐ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ .ܶ In the 
empirical analysis, we are faced with two challenging problems. First we have at our disposal a 
relatively small number of time-series observations at the annual frequency. Second for each 
country, we also have a large number of macroeconomic control variables which are low 
frequency and, hence, likely to be highly co-linear. Both factors can contribute to low precision 
of the parameter estimates of the panel-data VAR regressions. As a result, we decide on 
relatively coarse demographic proportions by ten-year age bands. Denote the share of age group 
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݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ?(0 -9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70+) in total population by ݓ௝௜௧and 
suppose the effect on the variable of interest, sayݔ௜௧, takes the form: 
 ݔ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ෍ ߜ௝ݓ௝௜௧଻௝ୀ଴ ൅ ݑ௜௧ Ǥ [5] 
As  ?௝ୀ଴଻ ݓ௝௜௧ ൌ  ?, there is perfect collinearity among the demographic proportions if all 
the demographic shares are included. To deal with this, we restrict the coefficients to sum to 0, 
useݓ௝௜௧ െ ݓ଻௜௧ as explanatory variables and recover the coefficient of the oldest age group 
fromߜ଻ ൌ െ ?௝ୀ଴଺ ߜ௝.  We denote the 7 (݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ?) elements¶ vector ofݓ௝௜௧ െ ݓ଻௜௧ as ௜ܹ௧. 
The six endogenous variables of the system are: 
1. the growth rate of the real GDP,ݕ௜௧;  
2. the share of investment in GDP,ܫ௜௧;  
3. the share of personal savings in GDP, ௜ܵ௧;  
4. the logarithm of hours worked11,ܪ௜௧;  
5. the nominal short interest rate,ܴ௜௧; and  
6. the rate of inflation,ߨ௜௧.  
We denote the vector of these six variables as ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ൫ݕ݅ݐǡ ܫ݅ݐǡ ܵ݅ݐǡ ܪ݅ݐǡ ܴ݅ݐǡ ߨ݅ݐ൯. The exogenous 
variables are: ௜ܹ௧and two lags of the logarithm of the real oil price.12 We allow for intercept 
                                                        
11It is customary in empirical studies to take the logarithm of continuous variables in order to (i) stabilize the 
variance of the variables a bit, to capture potential nonlinearities in the variable; (ii) to render residuals more 
symmetrically distributed; and (iii) to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient estimates of parameters as 
elasticities. 
12
 The reason we use two lags on the oil price, rather than one, is because the second lag is statistically significantly 
different from 0. 
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heterogeneity through ܽ௜but assume slope homogeneity and estimate a one-way fixed-effect 
augmented-panel VAR (2) of the form13: 
 ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ܣଵ ௜ܻǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ܣଶ ௜ܻǡ௧ିଶ ൅ ܦ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ Ǥ [6] 
plus two lags of the oil price. In Equation [6], ܦ is the matrix of coefficients of the demographic 
variables. The long-run moving equilibrium for the system is then given by: 
 ௜ܻ௧כ ൌ ሺܫ െ ܣଵ െ ܣଶሻିଵܽ௜ ൅ ሺܫ െ ܣଵ െ ܣଶሻିଵܦ ௜ܹ௧ Ǥ [7] 
where ሺܫ െ ܣଵ െ ܣଶሻିଵܦ captures the effect of the demographic variables. This reflects both the 
direct effect of demographics on each variable and the feedback between the endogenous 
variables. This allows, for instance, the effects of demography on savings to influence growth 
through the effect of savings on growth.  
We can isolate the long-run contribution of demography to each variable in each country 
by: 
 ௜ܻ௧஽ ൌ ሺܫ െ ܣଵ െ ܣଶሻିଵܦ ௜ܹ௧ Ǥ [8] 
This is the demographic attractor for the economic variables at any given time. In this 
analysis, we will examine the movements of elements of this vector, ௜ܻ௧஽, over time, to indicate 
the contribution of demographics to the evolution of a particular variable in a particular country. 
5.2 Results of Panel-data VAR regressions 
We examine both the short and long term impacts. By exploring the D matrix of short term 
demographic impacts on the six endogenous variables, we find that the individual coefficients 
are not very well determined due to high collinearity among the variables in the VAR 
                                                        
13
 We use a VAR (2) specification primarily to allow for more flexible dynamics and to deal with potential non-
stationarity. Moreover, working with a VAR (2) specification (instead of VAR(1) specification) reduces the 
potential of spurious regression although we believe that spurious regression is less of a problem in the panel data 
setting, in particular when the cross-section dimension is large relatively to the dimension of time series. 
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specification. However, the hypothesis that the coefficients of the demographic variables are 
jointly not significantly different from zero is strongly rejected for all equations except hours 




Table 4: VAR Results for Growth, Investment and Savings 
 GDP growth (y) Share of investment (I) Share of savings (S) 
 Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| ݕ௧ିଵ 0.277*** 0.058 4.775 0.138* 0.041 3.366 -0.071** 0.051 0.062 ܫ௧ିଵ -0.310*** 0.116 2.672 0.929*** 0.072 12.903 0.056 0.082 0.683 ܵ௧ିଵ 0.084 0.074 1.135 0.048 0.038 1.263 0.954*** 0.057*** 16.737 ܪ௧ିଵ 0.027 0.015 1.800 -0.024 0.018 1.333 0.011* 0.041 0.268 ܴ௧ିଵ -0.225 0.101 2.228 -0.090 0.029 3.103 -0.052 0.051 1.020 ߨ௧ିଵ -0.063* 0.051 1.235 0.021 0.041 5.122 0.013 0.032 0.406 ݕ௧ିଶ 0.011*** 0.037 0.297 0.062*** 0.032 1.937 -0.047 0.042 1.119 ܫ௧ିଶ 0.059 0.011 5.364 -0.194 0.048 4.042 -0.203* 0.082** 2.476 ܵ௧ିଶ -0.065 0.060 1.083 -0.051 0.029 1.759 -0.210 0.075*** 2.800 ܪ௧ିଶ -0.009 0.065 0.138 0.047 0.035 1.343 -0.129* 0.040*** 3.225 ܴ௧ିଶ -0.062 0.012 5.167 -0.021 0.031 0.677 -0.064* 0.041 1.561 ߨ௧ିଶ -0.052* 0.014 3.714 -0.012* 0.041 0.293 0.020 0.022 0.909 ܱܲܫܮ௧ିଵ -0.019*** 0.014 1.357 0.003 0.000 2.717 -0.011 0.000** 2.245 ܱܲܫܮ௧ିଶ 0.021 0.015 0.140 0.001*** 0.000 1.988 0.001 0.000* 1.929 ߜ଴ -0.029 0.081 0.358 0.062* 0.041 1.512 -0.065** 0.072 0.903 ߜଵ 0.217 0.101 2.148 -0.040 0.051 0.784 0.139 0.052 2.673 ߜଶ 0.182 0.071 2.563 0.093* 0.030 3.100 0.020 0.063 0.317 ߜଷ -0.004* 0.006 0.667 -0.067** 0.041 1.634 0.102*** 0.083 1.229 ߜସ 0.040 0.082 0.488 0.010 0.040 0.250 0.124 0.073* 1.700 ߜହ 0.045 0.082 0.549 0.040 0.051 0.784 0.210* 0.010** 2.100 ߜ଺ -0.000 0.101 0.004 0.230 0.101 2.277 0.031 0.102 0.304 ߜ଻ -0.455   -0.240   -0.314   ܴଶ 0.29   0.79   0.70   ሺߜ௝ ൌ  ?ሻ 0.000   0.00   0.000   
OBS 238   238   238   
Note: 1. The row for ሺߜ௝ ൌ  ?ሻ reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation. 2. * 







Table 5: VAR Results for Hours, Interest Rate and Inflation 
 Log of hours (H) Nominal interest rate (R) Inflation (࣊) 
 Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| ݕ௧ିଵ 0.204*** 0.041 4.976 0.150 0.162 0.926 0.252*** 0.084 3.000 ܫ௧ିଵ 0.002 0.081 0.025 -0.195 0.168 1.161 -0.390** 0.170 2.294 ܵ௧ିଵ 0.064 0.040 1.600 0.006* 0.063 0.095 0.031 0.182 0.170 ܪ௧ିଵ 1.128*** 0.055 20.509 0.241*** 0.049 4.918 0.153* 0.072 2.100 ܴ௧ିଵ -0.140 0.032 4.375 0.033 0.378 0.087 -0.123*** 0.155 0.793 ߨ௧ିଵ 0.010 0.031 0.322 0.124 0.132 0.939 0.541* 0.227** 2.383 ݕ௧ିଶ 0.041 0.033 1.242 0.062* 0.034 1.823 0.133 0.083 1.602 ܫ௧ିଶ -0.083 0.091 0.912 0.209 0.206 1.015 0.573 0.408 1.404 ܵ௧ିଶ -0.062 0.039 1.589 -0.038 0.054 0.703 0.040 0.084 0.476 ܪ௧ିଶ -0.192*** 0.045 4.267 0.386* 0.214 1.800 -0.159 0.077** 2.467 ܴ௧ିଶ -0.002 0.032 0.062 0.383* 0.211 1.815 -0.048 0.122 0.393 ߨ௧ିଶ 0.021 0.040 0.525 -0.071** 0.031 2.290 0.019 0.047 0.404 ܱܲܫܮ௧ିଵ -0.010*** 0.003 3.333 -0.011 0.003 0.367 -0.018*** 0.002 9.000 ܱܲܫܮ௧ିଶ 0.010*** 0.003 3.333 0.001 0.003 0.333 0.018*** 0.012 1.500 ߜ଴ -0.010 0.073 0.136 0.161*** 0.011 14.636 0.460 0.017*** 27.059 ߜଵ -0.070 0.082 0.853 0.041 0.091 0.450 0.100 0.158 0.633 ߜଶ 0.060* 0.064 0.937 -0.040 0.061 0.656 -0.140 0.129 1.085 ߜଷ 0.090 0.065 1.384 -0.181 0.121 1.496 -0.450 0.210** 2.143 ߜସ 0.020 0.062 0.323 -0.090 0.110 0.818 -0.261 0.203 1.286 ߜହ 0.120 0.094 1.277 0.070 0.151 0.463 -0.041 0.211* 0.194 ߜ଺ 0.090 0.091 0.989 0.220* 0.131 1.679 0.181 0.293 0.618 ߜ଻ -0.240   0.200   0.151   ܴଶ 0.95   0.89   0.87   ሺߜ௝ ൌ  ?ሻ 0.101   0.001   0.001   
OBS 238   238   238   
Note: 1. The row forሺߜ௝ ൌ  ?ሻ reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation. 2. * 




Note that the estimate of the coefficient Ɂ଺ (age group 60-69) on growth rate  is not 
significantly negative, and that on the oldest age group (Ɂ଻ ൌ െ ?௝ୀ଴଺ ߜ௝) is negative at -0.455, 
although it is not statistically significant. That is, an increase in the share of old age group (70+) 
appears to induce a negative impact on economic growth rate. This is consistent with the 
conclusion given in Bloom et al. (2010), which analyses the implications of population aging for 
economic growth. They argue that for OECD countries, projected aging population causes drops 
in both labor force participation and labor-force-to-population ratios and therefore suggests 
modest declines in the pace of economic growth. 
In theory, we would expect that the demographic structure has significant impacts on 
hours worked. That it does not in our empirical results may indicate that there are likely to be 
offsetting adjustments in the labor force participation rates. Generally the results are plausible, 
although there are some unexpected results. For instance there is a negative effect of the 30-39 
age group on growth and a positive effect of teenagers on savings and of the 60-69 years group 
on investment. 
Table 6 gives the ሺܫ െ ܣଵ െ ܣଶሻିଵܦ matrix. By comparison, we note that by allowing for 
rich dynamics and interactions among the macroeconomic variables, the long-run effects are 
found to be much larger. In particular, we notice that the effect on hours is markedly more 
pronounced in our empirical results, perhaps due to this variable being highly persistent over 
time. The VAR analysis supports the U-shape hypothesis found in Juselius and Takáts (2015, 
2016a, 2016b) and in our results. However, the lack of statistical significance of parameters 
again supports the motivation of our analysis in including older age groups to clarify the relation 


















(inflation) ߜ଴ -0.267 -0.190 -0.185 -0.109 0.575 0.975 ߜଵ 0.268 -0.170 0.591 -0.420 0.281 0.518 ߜଶ 0.088 0.432 -0.246 0.535 0.432 -0.213 ߜଷ 0.112 0.231* 0.361 1.864 -0.540 -1.002 ߜସ 0.082 0.049 0.411 0.610 -0.553 -0.584 ߜହ -0.037 0.139 0.802 0.822 0.261 -0.1341 ߜ଺ -0.314 0.310 -0.141 -1.015 0.470 0.172 ߜ଻ 0.0611 -1.021 -1.538 -1.433 -0.755 0.043 
Note: 1. * denotes significance at the 10% level 
The VAR analysis also enables us to perform further country-specific analysis. We 
consider how the results obtained in our study may shed some light on the question of whether 
the baby boomers squandered the demographic dividend. For this purpose, we conduct a 
counterfactual analysis. Table 7 shows, for the countries with available data, the impact on the 
six variables of the change in demographic structure between 1970 when the baby boomers were 
participating in the labor market, and 2010, when they were approaching retirement.14 This is 
calculated using Equation [7] and the long-run estimates from the one way fixed effect model 
(Equation [6]).  
  
                                                        
14
 Note that only for the purpose of conducting a counterfactual exercise do we include observations starting from 
1970 in our empirical analysis. In all other analysis, the estimation starts from 1999. This is because our experiment 
suggests that the panel-data VAR regressions exhibit major structural instabilities when the earlier samples from 
1970 to 1998 are included in the estimation, producing highly biased estimates of the parameters. 
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Table 7: Difference in Predicted Impact of Demographic Factors between 1970 and 2010 (in 





(share of invest) 
S 
(share of saving) 
H 





Australia -0.357 -0.174 -4.336 7.829 -7.911 -11.816 
Austria 1.448 -0.555 -0.879 11.041 -9.522 -11.895 
Belgium 0.183 -2.579 -4.962 4.187 -7.059 -7.250 
Canada -1.251 -0.655 -3.922 11.694 -9.639 -15.141 
Denmark -0.496 -1.781 -1.833 1.758 -5.675 -6.256 
Finland -1.750 -4.393 -9.207 -3.667 -7.590 -7.433 
France -0.261 -2.498 -4.292 3.896 -6.580 -7.627 
Germany 1.404 -7.101 -10.007 -8.796 -12.773 -9.584 
Greece 0.215 -3.587 -9.478 5.017 -11.058 -11.411 
Iceland -0.18340 2.065 -0.752 16.220 -8.736 -14.764 
Ireland 0.830 5.093 0.934 22.338 -9.908 -17.299 
Italy 0.105 -5.575 -11.659 1.1865 -11.069 -11.576 
Japan -2.884 -10.418 -17.562 -16.961 -9.913 -7.166 
Netherlands -0.751 -0.852 -2.051 5.855 -7.690 -10.916 
New Zealand 0.018 0.883 -3.149 13.266 -9.063 -13.647 
Norway 0.455 0.095 -0.817 9.392 -6.475 -9.083 
Sweden -0.052 -3.631 -4.885 -1.390 -5.488 -4.262 
Switzerland 0.240 -2.626 -3.188 3.862 -8.473 -9.169 
United Kingdom 0.985 -1.32 -4.075 5.238 -8.327 -8.425 
United States -0.686 0.822 -2.501 9.120 -6.426 -10.331 
Note: This was calculated by applying the estimated long-run demographic coefficients to the demographic structure 
in each country as it was in 1970 and in 2010, and subtracting the result of the former from the latter. Updated April 
20, 2015 to include Germany based on same parameter estimates as used for other countries. 
The estimated impact of demographic changes on inflation varies across countries.  We 
find that the estimated impact of demographic changes on both the interest rate and inflation is 
strongly negative and of quite similar orders of magnitude, consistent with real interest rate 
effects. Since the 1970s was the decade when the baby boomers entered the labor force strongly, 
we might have expected the supply-side effect to be deflationary, the arrival of such a large 
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cohort depressing wages, but the demand-side effects might have been inflationary. Although 
both interest rates and inflation are expected to be higher around 1970 than in2010, the change 
over the period is not expected to be as large as predicted by demographic factors. However, 
caution regarding the actual, as opposed to the relative, magnitude is warranted, because the two-
way fixed-effects estimates suggest that the demographic effects on these two variables might be 
overstated. 
We further tested the robustness of our results with respect to the selected countries by 
re-estimating the specification in the panel-data VAR (2) regression on a dataset with each 
country excluded in turn. We obtain results that are relatively stable with respect to these 
exclusions, as are the tests as to whether the demographic variables are significant in each 
equation. 
We also performed a number of other robustness checks with respect to the matrix of 
correlations between residuals, the presence of trends in the data, and removal of time effects. 
The results of these checks were all satisfactory. They are not reported here for the sake of 
brevity, but are available on request. 
The panel VAR analysis had several limitations. Firstly, the short period of data 
necessitated analysis at the annual frequency, though it would be reasonable to assume that 
demography affects the economy in more subtle ways over longer periods of time. Secondly, 
both age structure and inflation exhibit long memory and there is a risk of detecting spurious 
relationships if the possibility of co-integration is not properly tested. Thirdly, estimation of the 
coefficients of low frequency and highly collinear determinants is highly sensitive to the 
specification of the model and the estimation method used. Lastly, although the proportions in 
each age group are plausibly exogenous, the other leading macroeconomic variables in the 
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system are likely to be responding to the low frequency demographic impacts. This endogeneity 
has the effect of reducing the marginal contribution of the demographic variables to the overall 
performance of the economy.  
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyze OECD panel data over the full period and sub-periods to investigate the 
impact of population aging on inflation. Our analysis suggests that it is the sub-period, rather 
than the panel sample, that shapes the pattern of the impact of aging on inflation. In addition, we 
believe that, as supported by the study on OECD data after 1990, a finer adjustment to age 
categories is needed to capture the potentially different effects of the older and younger of the 
65+ age group. That is, for the old population, the older the age, the more deflationary the cohort 
is. This finding suggests that studies on the old should use a greater number of age groups. This 
is particularly important because the size and the length of this age group is increasing due to 
increasing longevity. 
As for the OECD panel analysis, the challenge of determining the link between aging and 
inflation is that demographic changes exert (according to theory) opposing forces on price levels. 
Keeping population size constant, aging causes reduced expectations of growth and consumption 
(deflationary), while also reducing the resources available for production. This latter effect can 
take place directly or through structural transformation, which are both inflationary. An 
empirical examination of the relationship suffers from the danger of failing to control for other 
more salient factors that affect inflation. Moreover, the data appears to be a source of another 
problem ± there is very little evidence of deflationary episodes in our sample period, making it 




Given the limitations in getting a long period of consistently maintained data, we use a 
cross-country panel VAR model as a type of robustness check on our analysis. Several key 
variables were modelled jointly to be able to identify the effect of the age distribution on 
inflation. Our results indicate that the age profile of the population can have both an 
economically and a statistically significant impact on output growth, investment, savings, hours 
worked, interest rates and inflation. However, the panel VAR analysis suggests that the older age 
group is slightly inflationary. This result may be caused by coarse demographic groups and short 
period studied.  Based on robustness checks conducted on the VAR analysis we believe that 
using such a model should provide more accurate predictions for growth and inflation over the 
long term horizon. 
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that demographic structure does affect economic 
factors such as inflation. However, the measurement and quantification of this impact remain 
challenging problems worthy of further research. This effect has significant implications for 
actuaries who make and rely on projections of demographic and economic effects in their work 
because demographic and economic assumptions are often set independently. The actuarial 
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